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CASENOTES
ARTICLE 9 GOVERNS ASSIGNMENT
OF VENDOR'S RIGHTS UNDER AN
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT
AS SECURITY FOR A DEBT
Erickson v. Seattle Trust & Savings Bank (In re Freeborn)1
To secure a loan from the defendant, the vendors under an installment
land contract 2 assigned their interest in the contract and conveyed the land
under contract to the defendant.3 The defendant recorded the assignment
1. 94 Wash. 2d 336, 617 P.2d 424 (1980).
2. The installment land contract is a purchase money financing device that
is the functional equivalent of a mortgage or deed of trust. SeeJ. CRIBBIT, PRIN-
CIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 135-36 (2d ed. 1975); G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON
& D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.25 (1979); Power, Land Contracts
as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 391, 393 (1966). The installment land con-
tract also is known as "contract for deed," "long-term land contract," or "bond
for deed," id., and it differs from the earnest money contract, which fixes the rights
and obligations of the parties from the time an agreement is reached to the date
of closing. The installment land contract is the financing method used for the life
of the debt; the earnest money contract is in force for a relatively short period while
the purchaser obtains financing and examines title. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON
& D. WHITMAN, supra, § 3.25.
When an installment land contract is used as the financing method for a real
estate purchase, the purchaser normally takes possession of the real estate when
the contract is executed and makes monthly payments of principal and interest.
The vendor retains legal title for security purposes until the entire purchase price
is paid and executes a deed to the land only when the purchaser makes the final
payment. See id. Historically, the installment land contract has been used as a mor-
tgage substitute to avoid expensive, time-consuming judicial foreclosure, see Com-
ment, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REV. 240, 244
(1959), or the statutory redemption that may be allowed. after a valid foreclosure
sale. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra, § 8.4.
The installment land contract has been popular in low-equity financing. See
generally Mixon, Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income Transactions, With
Proposals for Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in the Inner City, 7
HOUS. L. REV. 523 (1970).
3. 94 Wash. 2d at 338, 617 P.2d at 426. A companion case, Patricelli v.
1
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and conveyance, which was marked "for security purposes only," '4 in ac-
cordance with Washington real estate recording law.5 After the vendors filed
a petition in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held that the right to receive
payments under the installment land contract was personalty; thus, Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governed the transfer of that right to
secure a debt. Because the defendant had not perfected its security interest
in accordance with Article 9,6 the bankruptcy court allowed it no priority
to the vendors' rights under the contract and ruled that the trustee could
collect the payments. 7 On appeal to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, the district court certified two questions
on Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court: (1) is the right to
receive payments under an installment land contract personal property s and
(2) is the transfer of that right to secure a debt governed by Article 9?9 The
Washington Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative and
agreed with the bankruptcy court. 10
Because it has become more difficult to obtain third-party financing for
purchases of real estate during the present inflationary period, use of the
vendor-financed installment land contract is increasing." This financing
method is spreading into states that have used it infrequently. 2 In those
states, there is little case law on the characterization of the interests of the
vendor and purchaser in the installment land contract and on the legal con-
sequences that may result from that characterization. Decisions from other
jurisdictions that have characterized the interests will influence the developing
body of case law. Since the rights, obligations, and priorities of subsequent
assignees and creditors of the vendor depend on this characterization, the
Freeborn decision is important for parties that enter transactions with a ven-
dor after he has sold his real estate by installment land contract.
Thurston (In re Hyak Skiing Corp.), dealt with an assignment of the contract
payments without conveyance of the real estate. Id. at 339, 617 P.2d at 426.
4. Id. at 339, 617 P.2d at 426. Only one document, a "Deed and Seller's
Assignment of Real Estate Contract," was used.
5. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.04.020, .08.070 (1966).
6. Id. §§ 62A.9-101 to -507. See also note 36 infra.
7. 94 Wash. 2d at 339, 617 P.2d at 426.
8. Id. See notes 13-31 and accompanying text infra.
9. 94 Wash. 2d at 341, 617 P.2d at 427. See notes 32-42 and accompanying
text infra.
10. 94 Wash. 2d at 340, 343, 617 P.2d at 426, 428.
11. See Nelson, The Use of Installment Land Contracts in Missouri-Courting Clouds
on Title, 33 J. MO. B. 161 (1977).
12. See also Nelson, supra note 11, at 167, in which the author advances three
reasons for the increasing use of installment land contracts in Missouri: (1) the
spillover effect from adjoining states that use them frequently, (2) the risk in low
down payment situations that the vendee will not assert his rights if forfeiture is
attempted, and (3) the vendor's desire to regain the land on default rather than to
lose it at a foreclosure sale.
2
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In answering the first question, Freeborn characterized the interest of a
vendor under an installment land contract as personalty. 13 In reaching this
decision, the court relied on another Washington case, Meltzer v.
Wendell-West, 14 which characterized the vendor's interest in an installment
land contract as personalty for community property purposes. 1 5 The Freeborn
court also relied on Cascade Security Bank v. Butler,16 which held that the in-
terest of an installment land contract purchaser was an interest in real estate
within the meaning of the Washington judgment lien statutes. 17 The Freeborn
court referred to cases catalogued in Cascade as "supporting the characteriza-
tion of a vendee's interest as real property and a vendor's interest as per-
sonal property."'
Characterizing the interests of vendor and purchaser as real or personal
property is important in determining the rights of a judgment creditor of
either party. In most states, ajudgment, from the time it is docketed, becomes
a lien on all real property owned by the judgment debtor within the county19
and gives the creditor the right to foreclose the lien by sale of the real
property. 20 Thus, when ajudgment debtor is a party to an installment land
contract, the characterization of his interest in the contract will determine
his judgment creditor's rights in the real estate under contract.
The majority ofjurisdictions that have decided the issue has characterized
the vendor's interest in the contract as realty to which a judgment lien will
13. 94 Wash. 2d at 340-41, 617 P.2d at 426.
14. 7 Wash. App. 90, 497 P.2d 1348 (1972).
15. Id. at 95-97, 497 P.2d at 1351-52.
16. 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
17. Id. at 780, 567 P.2d at 632-33. Before the Cascade decision, Washington
courts had ostensibly followed the doctrine of Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649,
233 P. 29 (1925), that an installment land contract conveyed "no title or interest,
either legal or equitable, to the vendee." Id. at 650, 233 P. at 30. Washington courts
had distinguished Ashfordfrequently, and it was overruled in Cascade. 88 Wash. 2d
at 784, 567 P.2d at 634.
18. 94 Wash. 2d at 340, 617 P.2d at 427. This characterization of the interests
of vendor and purchaser is consistent with the result reached by using the doctrine
of equitable conversion. Under that doctrine, the purchaser in equity becomes the
equitable owner of the land at the moment a contract for the sale of land is signed;
his interest is real property. The vendor retains legal title for security purposes only;
his interest is personal property. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.3 (1973). The Cascade
court declined to adopt the doctrine on the theory that it "would merely substitute
a new set of uncertainty for the confusion that has followed Ashford." 88 Wash. 2d
at 783, 567 P.2d at 634. The Freeborn court did not mention the doctrine of equitable
conversion.
19. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 511.350 (Gum. Supp. 1981).
20. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.29 (A. Casnered. 1952) (rights
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attach; 21 the doctrine of equitable conversion has not precluded this result. 22
The majority premises this characterization on the vendor's retention of legal
title. In theory, he has an interest in realty for the amount of the unpaid pur-
chase price. 23
A minority of jurisdictions holds that the vendor's right to receive
payments under the contract is personalty24 and requires ajudgment creditor
to reach that interest by garnishment 25 or a creditor's bill in equity. 26 The
minority view is supported by the doctrine of equitable conversion. 27 Also,
since most states consider the purchaser's interest in the contract to be realty
for judgment lien purposes, the minority position reflects the view that the
interests of both parties to the contract cannot be realty. 28 Legal writers have
21. See, e.g., Chain O'Mines, Inc. v. Williamson, 101 Colo. 231,236,72 P.2d
265, 267 (1937); First Sec. Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429 P.2d 386, 389
(1967); Bauermeister v. McDonald, 124 Neb. 142, 146, 247 N.W. 424, 426 (1932);
Heider v. Dietz, 234 Or. 105, 116, 380 P.2d 619, 624 (1963); Reid v. Gorman,
37 S.D. 314, 321, 158 N.W. 780, 783 (1916); Heath v. Dodson, 7 Wash. 2d 667,
673, 110 P.2d 845, 847 (1941).
22. See Heider v. Dietz, 234 Or. 105, 114, 380 P.2d 619, 624 (1963) (court
recognized doctrine of equitable conversion as legal fiction and noted that doctrine
was not universally applicable). The court concluded that "[t]he reasons which per-
suade equity to hold that equitable conversion applies in devolution cases, or...
in risk of loss cases, do not necessarily carry over to cases involving the rights of
third-party creditors havingjudgment liens upon real property." Id. at 114-15, 380
P.2d at 624.
23. Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 477, 505
(1973).
24. See, e.g., Cumming v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Iowa 667, 669, 202 N.W. 556,
556 (1925);Jones v. Howard, 142 Mo. 117, 125, 43 S.W. 635, 636 (1897); Mueller
v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 507, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956). See generally
Note, Rights of a Judgment CreditorAgainst a Vendor or Vendee Following an Executory Con-
tract for the Sale of Land, 43 IOWA L. REV. 366 (1958); Construction Lien Claimants'Rights
Against Purchase Contract Interests: The Role of Equitable Conversion, 1980 WIS. L. REV.
615.
25. SeeJones v. Howard, 142 Mo. 117, 125, 43 S.W. 635, 636 (1897) ("It
[the vendor's lien for the purchase price] is not subject to sale, but must be reached
by garnishment proceedings.").
26. See Note, supra note 24, at 373.
27. See 1980 WIS. L. REV., supra note 24, at 620-21. For an explanation of
equitable conversion, see note 18 supra.
28. Each party to the contract has an interest in both realty and personalty.
While the vendor has an interest in receiving the contract payments, which is per-
sonalty, he also holds legal title to the land, which is realty. The purchaser usually
has possession of the land under contract and does have a right to ownership of the
land if he pays the purchase price, which is an interest in realty. He also has a per-
sonal property interest in the obligation to pay the contract price. Note, 1980 WIS.
L. REV., supra note 24, at 616 n.8.
1982]
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sided with the minority view because, not only does it facilitate satisfaction
of judgments, it is logically consistent.29
Jurisdictions that have not characterized the interests of vendor and pur-
chaser for all purposes may avoid the tension between the Freeborn decision
and the majority rule. While the characterization of a contract vendor's in-
terest as personalty is supportable, the adoption of that characterization in
a majority rule jurisdiction will result in characterizing the vendor's interest
as realty for judgment lien purposes but as personalty for Article 9 purposes.
A court in ajurisdiction that follows the majority rule should reconsider that
characterization before following Freeborn. Since there is room for argument
on the proper characterization of the vendor's interest for judgment lien
purposes,30 a court considering the adoption of the Freeborn position could
characterize the vendor's interest as personalty for judgment lien and other
purposes. A minority jurisdiction, which already characterizes the vendor's
right as personalty, will be able to follow Freeborn without being inconsistent. 31
After deciding that the vendor's right to payment under an installment
land contract was personalty, the Freeborn court turned to the second ques-
tion: is the transfer of that right to secure a debt governed by Article 9? Section
9-102(1)(a)3 2 indicates that for Article 9 to govern a transaction, at least two
requirements must be met. First, the parties must intend to create a secur-
ity interest in the collateral. Second, the collateral must be personal prop-
erty. The court characterized the transaction between the vendor and the
bank as an assignment of contract rights33 and cited Hughes v. Russo (In re
EquitableDevelopment Corp.)34 to show that Article 9 governed the assignment.
To secure a loan, the Hughes vendor-debtor transferred to the lender install-
ment land contracts via a "Security Pledge Agreement. '35 The lender
promptly recorded the security agreement under real estate recording law,
but did not perfect 36 the security interest under Article 9 until one month
29. See note 36 infra.
30. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
31. One Missouri case, Jonesv. Howard, 142 Mo. 117, 43 S.W. 635 (1897),
has characterized the vendor's interest in an installment land contract as personalty.
Missouri, therefore, has precedent for adopting the Freeborn position. InJones, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that a vendor who had received partial payment of
the purchase price of real estate under an installment land contract retained no in-
terest that could be sold at an execution sale, at which only real property can be
sold. Instead, the vendor was viewed as having a lien for the remainder of the pur-
chase price, subject to garnishment rather than execution. Id. at 125, 43 S.W. at 636.32. U.C.C. § 9 -102(1)(a).
33. 94 Wash. 2d at 341, 617 P.2d at 425-26.
34. 20 U.C.0. REP. SERV. 1349 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 1976).
35. Id. at 1350. The land under contract was not conveyed as it was in Freeborn.
36. Washington has adopted the 1962 version of Article 9, which requires that
a financing statement be filed to perfect a security interest in contract rights, unless
the assignment does not transfer a significant part of the contract rights of the
[Vol. 47
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after the vendor-debtor had filed a petition in bankruptcy.37 The bankruptcy
court found that the security interest was unperfected when the debtor
became insolvent38 and, therefore, relegated the lender to general creditor
status.
The Hughes court found that the parties met the first requirement of sec-
tion 9-102(1)(a) because they intended to create a security interest in the
contracts.3 9 The court found that intent present because the agreement was
entitled "Security Pledge Agreement," it referred to the lender as the
"secured party," and it made explicit reference to compliance with Article
9.40 In Freeborn, the intent to create a security interest was clear because the
agreement contained a recital that the transfer was for security purposes only.
The Hughes court, like the Freeborn court, also found that the parties met the
second requirement of section 9-102(1)(a) because it characterized the right
to receive contract payments as personal property.41
assignor. WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 62A.9-302(1)(e) (1966). Missourihas the same
provision. MO. REV. STAT. § 400.9-302(1)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981). In the 1972 ver-
sion of Article 9, the term "contract rights" has been deleted and the definition
of "accounts" in U.C.C. § 9-106 has been broadened to encompass contract rights.
Classifying the collateral is important because some Article 9 security interests
are perfected by taking possession of the collateral, while others are perfected by
filing a financing statement. In order to perfect a security interest in personal prop-
erty, the secured party must first determine how the Article 9 collateral is classified.
Classifring the vendor's interest in an installment land contract is difficult because
there is no underlying note; the contract is the only document of the transaction.
Professor Lacy suggests that the contract is either chattel paper or an instrument
and concludes that while chattel paper "seems the better choice,... there is no
security interest in 'goods.' 'Instrument' applies, literally, because the contract is
not a 'security agreement'; at least it does not create a 'security interest' as defined
in section 1-201(37)." Lacy, supra note 23, at 505 n. 11. Another commentator has
concluded that a security interest created in the contract is an Article 9 general in-
tangible. Se Bowmar, Real Estate Interests as Security Under the UCG: The Scope ofArti-
cle Nine, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 99, 143 (1979).
In general, a security interest in an instrument must be perfected by posses-
sion of the collateral. U.C.C. 5 9-304(1). A security interest in a general intangi-
ble, however, must be perfected by filing a fmancing statement. U.C.C. §§ 9-302,
-305. If a court were to follow Professor Lacy's theory, a security interest in an in-
stallment land contract could be perfected only by taking possession of the contract;
filing a financing statement would not meet the perfection requirement, and the
creditor would be unsecured. If the security interest in the contract were a general
intangible, however, the creditor would be unsecured if he took possession of the
contract but did not file a financing statement.
37. Hughes v. Russo (In re Equitable Dev. Corp.), 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
at 1350.
38. Id. at 1354-55.
39. Id. at 1352.
40. Id.
41. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
19821
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To buttress its answer to the second question, the Freeborn court analo-
gized the transaction between assignee and vendor to the mortgage trans-
action described in an official comment to section 9-102(3).42 The comment
indicates that Article 9 governs the pledge of a note secured by a real estate
mortgage, if given to secure an obligation to a third party, even though Article
9 does not govern creation of the mortgage. Since the installment land con-
tract vendor holds legal title to the land under contract for security purposes
and is functionally the mortgagee of his vendee, this official comment would
seem to cover the assignment of the vendor's interest in the contract, if
assigned as security to a third party.
Despite the apparent applicability of the official comment to Freeborn and
the analogous mortgage pledge situation, commentators are split on whether
Article 9 governs the assignment of a mortgage as security for a debt.43 This
difference of opinion stems from an apparent conflict between two sections
of Article 9. Section 9-1040) states that Article 9 does not apply "to the crea-
tion or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or
42. The Freeborn court quoted U.C.C. 5 9-102, Official Comment 4 (1972 ver-
sion), which provides:
The owner of Blackacre borrows $10,000 from his neighbor, and
secures his note by a mortgage on Blackacre. This Article is not applicable
to the creation of the real estate mortgage. Nor is it applicable to a sale
of the note by the mortgagee, even though the mortgage continues to secure
the note. However, when the mortgagee pledges the note to secure his own
obligation to X, this Article applies to the security interest thus created,
which is a security interest in an instrument even though the instrument
is secured by a real estate mortgage.
Washington's version of Official Comment 4 is identical to the first two sentences
quoted above, but it then states, "However, when the mortgagee in turn pledges
this note and mortgage to secure his own obligation to X, this Article is applicable
to the security interest thus created in the note and the mortgage." WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 62A.9-102, Official Comment 4 (1966). While there is little difference
in the language of the two versions, the 1972 version relied on by the court seems
to exempt the mortgage from coverage while applying Article 9 to the note.
43. See Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination
Agreements, Security Interests in Money andDeposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation
Agreements, 79 HARV. L. REv. 229 (1965). Influential sponsors of the U.C.C. replied
to the contention of title companies that the pledge of a mortgage was a Code trans-
action falling within the category of a general intangible. The commentators stated
that the "clear intent of section 9-104(j) to exclude transfers of liens on real estate
would be completely nullified if the argument were accepted that the lien, as a form
of wealth, is personal property, a security interest in which is subject to article 9."
Id. at 270-71. They concluded that "[t]here is, in our opinion, no danger that a
court could read the statute in any such fashion." Id. at 271. Another commen-
tator, writing at the same time, felt that Article 9 did apply to "security transfers
of instruments or writings which evidence or embody interests in real property."
G. GILMORE, 1 SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 311 (1965).
[Vol. 47
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rents thereunder"; section 9-102(3) provides that the "application of this
Article to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the
fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to which
this Article does not apply." Some commentators believe that section 9-1040)
controls over section 9-102(3) and the explanatory official comment. In other
words, a mortgage is an interest in or lien on real estate; therefore, Article
9 does not govern the transfer of that interest as security for a debt.44 The
court's answer to the first question, which held the vendor's interest to be
personal property, however, made it unnecessary to resolve this controversy
because Article 9 expressly includes any transfer of personalty intended to
create a security interest. 45
The Freeborn decision provides a warning to lenders who secure loans
with a vendor's interest in an installment land contract. If the land is con-
veyed, the deed, of course, must be recorded according to local real estate
law. It also would be wise to record the assignment. 46 But, of most concern,
the security interest thus created should be perfected in accordance with
Article 9 because a court may characterize the vendor's right to receive
payments as personalty, a security interest which must be perfected under
Article 9. In order to be protected in any situation, the lender should take
possession of the contract and file a financing statement in all appropriate
offices. Thus, a prudent lender must perfect his security interest in the con-
tract as both a real and personal property security device to have priority
over subsequent bona fide purchasers.
GENA GLASER TRUEBLOOD
44. The trend seems to be toward separate treatment of the note and the
underlying security embodied by the mortgage, particularly after the adoption in
1966 of the modified Official Comment 4. If a mortgage were the only evidence
of the obligation as well as a lien on the real estate, then it would seem that the mort-
gage arguably could fall within the Code. This is usually the situation with the in-
stallment land contract. See Comment, An Article Nine Scope Problem-Mortgages,
Leases, and Rents as Collateral, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 449, 455 (1976).45. u.C.C. §912l()
46. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON&D. WHITMAN, supra note 2, §5.34 (com-
prehensive discussion of risks assignee of note secured by mortgage takes when he
does not record assignment).
1982]
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